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4.1  Introduction 
All modern societies attempt to measure well-being of their people for 
both policy and research purposes.  Government  must explicitly define 
well-being for purposes of  designing tax and welfare policies, while re- 
searchers must explicitly choose classifications by which to compare data 
and perform statistical analyses. 
Measures of well-being involve a contrast of  means with needs. This 
chapter falls within that set of studies that deal with the measurement of 
means (Steuerle and McClung 1977; Smeeding 1982; and several chapters 
in this volume). Changing the measure of  means does not necessarily im- 
ply  that  households  are better  or worse off, nor that the government 
should collect less or spend more for any particular type of program. Given 
any standard of needs, however, it will be possible to assert that the distri- 
bution of means, and therefore of well-being, changes significantly as the 
measurement of means is changed. 
Attention will be directed toward the measure of  well-being used most 
widely today-realized  income-and  its relationship to wealth and eco- 
nomic income.  Using a unique national sample of  income tax returns 
matched with estate tax returns, this chapter will  compare the realized 
property income of individuals with the associated amount of wealth that 
generates that income. 
Eugene Steuerle is deputy director (domestic taxation) of the Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. 
Department of  the Treasury, and economic staff coordinator for the Treasury Department 
Project for Fundamental Tax Reform. At the time of  presentation, he was a Federal Execu- 
tive Fellow at the Brookings Institution. 
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The purpose of this study is twofold. First, with respect to wealth hold- 
ers, realized income (with emphasis on the word realized)  is demonstrated 
to be an extremely poor measure of well-being. As a consequence, sub- 
stantial inequity is introduced into tax and welfare programs. If the goal 
of these programs is to measure real economic income, that purpose may 
be better served by first obtaining measures of property or wealth than re- 
alized income. Second, in reporting the initial findings of the first national 
estate-income collation, this chapter shows the promise of this approach 
to research on the relationship between wealth and income. Whatever the 
problems, and they are not few, this estate-income collation may provide 
the best national data ever assembled for studying the wealth-income rela- 
tionship for persons with significant  amounts of wealth. 
4.1.1  Source of Data 
This study uses a collation of estate tax returns, income tax returns of 
decedents in years before death, and income tax returns of heirs in years 
both prior to and following the death of the persons granting the be- 
quests. The estate tax returns were filed in 1977 (for deaths generally in 
1976 or 1977),  while income tax returns were collected for years 1974 
through 1980. Each estate in the sample had a gross estate of $60,000 or 
more ($120,000 or more for decedents dying in 1977). The collation sam- 
ple was a one-in-ten subsample of the sample of over 41 ,000 estate tax re- 
turns used for purposes of the Statistics of Income-Estate  Tax Returns 
(US. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service 1979) and for 
related wealth studies (Schwartz 1983). 
While the collation sample began with 4,143 estate tax returns, in many 
cases there was an absence of accurate reporting of bequests made, and 
many income tax returns could not be found or were not filed for both de- 
cedents and heirs. For purposes of this study, therefore, two subsamples 
were used: decedents with income tax returns in the year prior to death 
(sample size, 2,924); and nonspousal heirs for whom a bequest of $50,000 
or more could be determined, while income tax returns were filed in a year 
prior to and a year following receipt of inheritance (sample size, 1,45 1). 
The match of a decedent’s estate tax return with the previous year’s in- 
come tax return allowed a direct comparison of the realized or reported 
income from capital with the value of capital that produced that income. 
Similarly, the match of a bequest amount with income tax returns of an 
heir in years both prior to and after receiving the inheritance allowed com- 
parison of the change in realized or reported income with a change in 
wealth. 
Both types of comparisons suffer from the inexact match of income 
with wealth. Under ideal conditions, one would want to compare income 
on an instantaneous flow basis with the stock of wealth at a given point in 
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First, only annual flows of income are reported. Second, accounting for 
wealth takes place in a period different from that in which income is mea- 
sured. Because partial-year returns are often filed on behalf of  decedents 
in year of death, obtaining an annual measure of income requires the use 
of an income tax return in a year prior to death. In measuring change in 
income for heirs, on the other hand, it was necessary to allow a sufficient 
time to elapse so that income from inheritances would be reflected in their 
income tax returns rather than returns of estates. For both decedents and 
heirs, therefore, the comparison of income with wealth is inexact to the 
extent that any wealth transfer (not reported on estate tax returns), con- 
sumption out of wealth, or wealth accumulation out of income took place 
between the points in time at which measurements were made.  Those 
problems are believed to be minor for the vast majority of returns, al- 
though important in a small number of cases. 
For tax accounting reasons, a net upward bias exists in the measure of 
realized rates of return. Valuations for estate tax purposes are typically 
low for reported assets, especially businesses, farms, houses, and other il- 
liquid or infrequently traded assets. Estimates must be reasonable, but 
there is a strong incentive to provide the lowest among available esti- 
mates. In addition, much wealth from life insurance and pensions does 
not pass through estates, so estimates of value of estates and inheritances 
are understated. Observations are also excluded from each subsample 
when income tax returns of decedents or heirs could not be found; in some 
of these cases, the decedent or heir did not file a return because of low 
amounts of realized income.' 
Finally, the collation file has not yet been merged to obtain estate tax 
weights; therefore, the reported data are unweighted. Fortunately, estate 
tax filers were sampled according to size of gross estate. Weighted results 
in each wealth or similar class therefore would differ little from unweighted 
results, and most issues of within- or between-class differences can be ad- 
dressed either way. 
While these problems mean that the data must be interpreted with cau- 
tion, the estate-income match still offers the possibility of vast improve- 
ment in our understanding of the wealth-income relationship for persons 
with significant wealth holdings. An analogy might be provided by the im- 
provement in our understanding of the wealth distribution first obtained 
through the efforts of Lampman (1962) and Smith and Franklin (1974). 
Both then and now, the advantage of using administrative data stems in 
part from the considerable underreporting of wealth and income from 
property in survey data, even surveys dedicated to the measurement of 
1. It was not possible to distinguish between cases in which an income tax return was not 
filed and cases in which the return could not be found because of an invalid Social Security 
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such items. The evidence is fairly conclusive: even though there is some 
bias to underreport  for tax purposes,  population estimates of income 
from property or of wealth are much higher when using tax return data 
than survey data. As will be seen, the variation in realized rates of return is 
so great across taxpayers that our qualitative conclusions with respect to 
horizontal equity would hold even in the presence of significant bias and 
limitations of data. 
4.2  Why Realized Income Is Used as a Measure of Well-Being 
The most common measure of well-being used for both statistical and 
policy purposes is realized income. Realized income is used to define in- 
come tax burdens, eligibility for various tax expenditures such as deduc- 
tions for cost of health care and property tax relief, amount of assistance 
in various welfare programs, and distributions of  income by  class in 
many, if not most, census and survey analyses. The reason for this domi- 
nance is partly the result of historical circumstances. Originally, both in 
England and America, ability to  pay was measured by property ownership 
(Musgrave 1959). In modern times, however, income has come to domi- 
nate other measures such as property as the prime measure of ability to 
pay and eligibility to receive. A major explanation for this shift is the in- 
creasing importance of  wage income to most households’ well-being. 
When labor income for most households was thought to equal only sub- 
sistence income, was derived in the form of self-employment income, or 
was paid in the form of in-kind benefits such as crop sharing, it was largely 
treated as both nontaxable and nonmeasurable. 
With the development of the modern firm and the rise of the middle 
class, the problems of nontaxability and nonmeasurability dwindled enor- 
mously. Wage income now was large, varied markedly from one individ- 
ual to the next, and could no longer be treated merely as subsistence in- 
come. In addition, there was a significant improvement in the availability 
and accuracy of measures of income because wage payments were entered 
in two different sets of  accounts: those of employers and employees. In- 
creasingly, therefore, the measure of ability to pay or eligibility to receive 
has come to be defined as wage-plus-property income. This measure of 
means is often compared to a measure of needs such as a subsistence level 
of income, with income taxes being imposed principally above that level, 
and income-conditioned grants or subsidies targeted mainly below that 
level. 
Property is still used today to measure well-being for certain purposes, 
and debates do take place over such issues as asset tests in welfare pro- 
grams and methods of valuation for wealth subject to property tax and es- 
tate tax. Income has become the dominant measure of well-being for most 
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declined in relative importance. Moreover, since wage income is the major 
source of total income, the accuracy of the measure of wage income has 
tended to make income itself appear to be accurately reported or mea- 
sured, at least in aggregate terms. 
In recent years, there also has been increasing emphasis on providing 
incentives for investment and savings, perhaps even replacing an income 
tax with a consumption tax. This new emphasis has had an impact upon 
attempts to reflect more accurately property income or other current mea- 
sures of wealth in the measure of well-being, especially for tax purposes. 
Inaccuracy of the measure of well-being, whether on an income or con- 
sumption basis, is viewed by some as an insignificant issue. Although 
theoretically one can argue that improvement in the measure of property 
or property income need have no impact on marginal tax rates paid on re- 
turns to capital, it is sometimes feared that improvements in the measure 
of property income will not result simply in a more uniform treatment of 
such income, but also in an increase in the taxes paid on returns to capital. 
As one example, the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) was de- 
signed with little concern over the actual rates of depreciation of assets. 
The word depreciation was deliberately omitted in 1981 tax changes in fa- 
vor of the term cost recovery to make clear that the accurate measure of 
income was no longer a policy goal. We will return in section 4.5 to the 
question of whether it is possible to move closer to the goal of horizontal 
equity regardless of the choice between consumption and income taxes. 
4.2.1  The Realization Base 
In one sense the switch to income as a measure of well-being was as 
much a result of, as a cause of, prevalent accounting practices. Account- 
ing practices were also extremely influential in determining that the mea- 
sure of income to be used for most policy, as well as statistical purposes 
would be based primarily upon realizations. Accounting for income, with 
a number of  exceptions, has been associated with the realized payment 
and receipt of cash. The exceptions apply primarily at the business level, 
where accrual accounting is applied to such items as inventories and ac- 
counts receivable, and investment in plant, equipment, and buildings is 
treated differently from other expenses.*  At the household level, however, 
measures of income for tax, welfare, and other purposes have tended to 
be recognized only when they show up in the form of cash. (This cash flow 
logic by the way, also helps explain the reluctance to count payments of in- 
kind benefits in the measure of income.) 
It is well known that measuring income only when it shows up as house- 
hold cash flow falls short in several respects of a Haig-Simons definition 
2.  Even at the business level, major items of  income such as accrued capital gains and 
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of economic income. The measure ignores implicit flows of services from 
housing and durables, accruals (less realizations) of gains and losses on 
assets, and often accruals of rights and services provided through insur- 
ance and pension plans. In addition, in an inflationary environment, a 
cash-flow-based measure tends to reflect nominal returns from assets, not 
real returns. Real payments and receipts of interest, for instance, are over- 
stated by the inflationary component of the interest rate. Traditional mea- 
sures of income of households are distorted, therefore, by nonrealizations 
of service flows, gains on assets, and accruals of benefits in certain institu- 
tional accounts, as well as by the failure to make proper adjustments for 
inflation. 
In 1979 the income from over 80 percent of assets was found to benefit 
from one tax preference or another. Most of these preferences were a di- 
rect result of the tendency to recognize property income only when it 
showed up in the form of cash flow. As a result, only about 30 percent of 
the net real returns from capital were found to be reported on individual 
tax returns (Steuerle 1982). In addition, although most private payments 
of interest are deducted on tax returns, only about one-half of all interest 
receipts are taxed (Steuerle 1983~).  These findings help support the view 
that at the individual level, the recognition of  income from capital is in 
many ways a voluntary event for both tax and other purposes. 
The voluntariness of  the tax is actually a function of consumption 
needs (relative to income), risk, and knowledge. Put another way, the in- 
dividual tax (and loss of benefits or implicit tax in welfare systems) on 
capital income is in part a tax on liquidity, risk reduction and diversifica- 
tion, simplicity, and ignorance. More than half of all interest and dividend 
receipts reported on individual tax returns are reported by taxpayers aged 
sixty-five and over. The elderly realize a greater percentage of their in- 
come than other wealth holders, although as a group they do not appear 
to draw down their wealth (Menchik and David 1983). Persons recogniz- 
ing income from property are often in need of current receipts or liquid as- 
sets to cover consumption needs in the near future. For the person antici- 
pating  that  savings  may  be  needed  soon,  risk  can  also  be  reduced 
substantially by increasing the percentage of interest-bearing assets and 
by reducing the percentage of other assets in the portfolio. Those who re- 
alize capital gains or interest income also have greater opportunity for di- 
versification  relative to those who hold onto unrealized gains. 
For many taxpayers, however, the tax is hardly paid after elaborate cal- 
culations of some optimally designed portfolio that achieves the maximum- 
expected after-tax rate of return. For these taxpayers, and to some extent 
for all taxpayers, the tax is merely a tax on simplicity and ignorance. 
It is not hard to  find examples. Many persons fail to achieve tax savings 
obtainable by switching to assets of equal yield and equal risk, but with 
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for employee contributions; annuities with withdrawal rights can replace 
savings accounts; direct shareownership can replace ownership of mutual 
funds that recognize capital gains frequently, and so forth. Ownership can 
also be transferred among family members, a practice used less frequently 
than possible both by taxpayers and certain welfare (principally elderly 
Medicaid) recipients. The persons paying the additional direct or implicit 
taxes may find their time too valuable to search out alternative mecha- 
nisms for achieving tax savings and government benefits; they may find it 
distasteful to play socially unproductive games; or they may simply be ig- 
norant of the laws.) 
The voluntary nature of capital income realization does not imply that 
the total tax paid on returns from capital is too high or too low, nor that 
total welfare payments should be larger or smaller. Such issues are not ad- 
dressed here and, to be treated properly, would require consideration of 
measures of needs, as well as the ways in which the various tax and welfare 
systems combine or stack on top of each other. What the voluntary nature 
of capital income recognition will imply, however, is that the taxes paid 
and benefits received will vary tremendously among persons in fairly iden- 
tical circumstances, and that income classifiers in statistical analyses will 
be inaccurate for many purposes. 
4.3  A Comparison of  Realized Income and Wealth 
Aggregate data on income recognition lends support to the notion that 
substantial horizontal inequity is created when tax and welfare systems 
base the measure of well-being in part on recognized property income. To 
reinforce this view, we now turn to microdata on households. 
Our first comparison of wealth and income is between wealth in estates 
of  decedents and their reported income in the year prior to death. Table 
4.1 summarizes the sources of income and wealth for this sample. As is 
immediately apparent, by far the most important sources of recognized 
capital income are dividends and interest.  Realized rates  of  return on 
farms and business assets are especially low, especially when it is noted 
that reported farm and business income represents returns to labor as well 
as capital. 
Table 4.2 narrows our focus to a comparison of gross capital income 
subject to tax (GCIST) and wealth. The realized rate of return declines sig- 
nificantly as wealth increases, reaching a low of 2.2 percent for decedents 
3. One can model ignorance as a cost of acquiring  information. If we assume that the cost 
of acquiring information rises with one’s ignorance of the tax and welfare laws, however, 
then the tax and welfare systems still impose taxes that rise with ignorance. These taxes can 
be paid directly to the government or indirectly to advisors. 
4.  For a separate analysis of the returns to owners of farms and closely held businesses, 
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Table 4.1  All Decedents: Average Income and Wealth by Source 
Income by Source 
Item as a Percentage of 
Average 
Amount  Net Income  Net 
of  Item  Subiect to Tax  Worth 






Small business corporations 
Capital gain distributions 
Net capital gain 
Supplemental gain 
Pensions and annuities 
Rents 
Royalties 
Estate and trusts 
Alimony 
Other 
Gross income subject to tax 
Less:  Interest deductions 
Net income subject to tax 
Plus:  State income tax returns 
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Wealth by Source 
Average  Item as a 
Amount  Percentage of 
of  Item  Total Wealth 
Corporate stock 
Real estate 
Cash, bonds, notes and mortgages 
Noncorporate business assets 
Other assets 
Total wealth (total estate) 
Net worth (economic estate) 
Less: Debts 
















Note:  Measures of income are from decedent’s individual income tax return filed for 
year prior to death. Measures of wealth are from decedent’s estate tax return. 
with assets of $2.5 million or more. What is equally interesting is the large 
variation in realized rates of return in every wealth class. At least 5 percent 
of each wealth class report zero or negative returns from capital, while at 
least 23 percent of each class report rates of return between 0 percent and 3 
percent. Table 4.2  AU Decedents: Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of Wealth (amounts  in thousands of dollars) 
Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of  Wealth 
Zero or Negative  Under 3 Percent 
Average  Gross Capital 
Gross  Income as a  Gross  Gross 
Total  Average  Capital  Percentage of  Capital  Capital 
Size of Wealth  Number  Wealth  Income  Wealth  Number  Wealth  Income  Number  Wealth  Income 
Under $100,000  519  72  9  12.4  41  3,269  -43  120  9,620  140 
$100,000 under $250,000  980  164  10  6.1  66  10,460  -140  263  42,429  547 
$250,000 under $500,000  445  344  20  5.9  22  7,597  -139  102  35,261  532 
$500,000 under $1,000,000  668  675  34  5.1  39  25,608  -775  168  114,206  1,273 
$I,000,OOO under $2,500,000  255  1,458  70  4.8  18  25,638  -144  75  110,868  1,656 
$2,500,000 or more  57  8,272  183  2.2  9  48,197  -578  23  314,916  1,211 
All decedents  2,924  563  26  4.5  195  120,770  -2,116  751  627,302  5,361 
Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of  Wealth (continued) 
Size of  Wealth 
3 Percent under 5 Percent  5 Percent under 7 Percent  7 Percent under 10 Percent 
Gross  Gross  Gross 
Capital  Capital  Capital 
Number  Wealth  Income  Number  Wealth  Income  Number  Wealth  Income 
Under $100,000  99  7,930  315  57  4,340  260  48  3,850  33 1 
$100,000 under $250,000  235  39,291  1,541  161  27,583  1,623  98  15,943  1,360 
$250,000 under $500,000  109  37,055  1,487  92  3 1,282  1,808  54  18,931  1,575 
$500,000 under $1,000,000  204  139,757  5,692  119  78,818  4,628  70  47,243  3,852 
$1,000,000 under $2,500,000  93  134,038  5,337  29  41,848  2,436  22  32,441  2,618 
$2,500,000 or more  14  71,788  2,591  7  24,838  1,462  2  6,128  507 
All decedents  754  429,860  16,964  465  208,707  12,216  294  124,534  10,244 Table 4.2 (continued) 
Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax 
as a Percentage of  Wealth (continued) 
10 Percent under 15 Percent  15 Percent or More 
Gross  Gross 
Capital  Capital 
Size of  Wealth  Number  Wealth  Income  Number  Wealth  Income 
Under $lOa,OOO  42  2,968  358  112  5,192  3,237 
$l00,OOO under $250,000  81  13,338  1,579  76  11,969  3,232 
$250,000 under $500,000  40  14,490  1,716  26  8,398  1,916 
$500,000 under $1,000,OOO  39  25,314  3,059  29  19,720  4,627 
$2,500,000 or more  -  -  -  2  5,645  1,751 
All decedents  213  73,247  8,636  252  60,716  18,761 
$1 ,000,000 under $2,500,000  11  12,137  1,925  7  9,790  3,999 101  Wealth, Realized Income, and the Measure of Well-Being 
Rates of return of 10 percent or more are reported by 30 percent of the 
lowest-wealth class, with the proportion dropping to 4 percent for those 
with assets of $2.5 million or more. A separate analysis (not shown in the 
tables) was made on persons reporting unusually high rates of return. 
Capital gains were only a minor factor in explaining these rates; dividend 
and interest income, on the other hand, were implausibly high relative to 
total assets. Problems of accounting period differences or estate tax valu- 
ation are probably most significant for this group. That is, either many of 
these persons underreport wealth, or they transfer or consume wealth be- 
tween accounting periods. 
In table 4.3 we turn to a sample of beneficiaries other than surviving 
spouses, and compare the change in reported capital income between 1975 
and 1978 to the amount of inheritance received in 1976 or 1977. Table 4.3 
does not show any strong relationship between amount of inheritance and 
realized rate of return, but it does show striking differences within inheri- 
tance classes. In each class (except one class with a sample size of three), 
between 17 percent and 32 percent of all inheritors actually show a nega- 
tive or zero change in gross capital income subject to tax. On the other 
hand, about 12 percent of those with inheritances under $250,000 and 7 
percent of those with inheritances over $250,000 show a change in capital 
income that was equal to 20 percent or more of the recorded change in 
wealth. 
Since reported capital income would normally increase over time re- 
gardless of inheritances, the number of  inheritors reporting low or nega- 
tive amounts of change becomes even more striking. Between 1975 and 
1978, the average individual  income tax return showed an increase of 
about 27 percent (from $1,752 to $2,218) in reported capital income, as 
contrasted with a 69 percent increase (from $12,792 to $21,562) for our 
sample (see table 4.4). If the change in interest rates, dividend rates, and 
growth in wealth in the economy were to have approximately equal effect 
on realized returns  for both groups,  capital income of  inheritors also 
would have grown by 27 percent in absence of  the inheritances. Thirty- 
nine percent (27 percent169 percent) of the increase in reported capital in- 
come would then be attributable to factors other than the inheritances 
themselves. 
Although table 4.3 shows little difference in realized rates of  return 
across inheritors by size of inheritance, table 4.5 provides some explana- 
tion. The ratio of the change in income to  change in wealth is shown to de- 
cline significantly with an increase in the amount of capital income reported 
prior to the receipt of the inheritance. That is, beneficiaries with substan- 
tial amounts of realized income from wealth prior to the receipt of their 
inheritances were much quicker to convert their inheritances into assets 
for which the rate of  income recognition would be low. Three consistent 
explanations can be offered for such behavior: (1) those with more capital Table 4.3  Change in Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of Inheritance Received (amounts in dollars) 
Gross Capital Income  Change in 
Subject to Tax  Income Change 
Income  Inheritance  as a Percentage of  -  Number of 
Size of Inheritance  Beneficiaries  1975  1978  1975 -  78  Received  Inheritance 
Under $100,000  75 1 
$100,000 under $250,000  521 
$250,000 under $500,000  134 
$500,000 under $1,000,000  42 
$1,000,000 under $2,500,000  3 
$2,500,000 or more  - 
TOTAL  1,451 
7,427,011  10,161,407  2,734,396  52,935,141  5.17 
7,693,609  11,823,199  4,129,590  80,309,87  1  5.14 
1,615,962  5,603.5 13  3,98735 1  45,671,922  8.73 
1,506,610  2,874,181  1,367,571  28,563,514  4.79 
3  18,062  823,375  505,3  13  3,603,179  14.02 
18,561,254  31,285,675  12,724,42  1  211,083,627  6.03 
Size of Inheritance 
Under $100,000 
$100,000 under $250,000 
$250,000 under $500,000 
$500,000 under $1,000,000 
$1,ooO,000 under $2,500,000 
$2,500,000 or more 
TOTAL 
Change in Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of Inheritance 
Zero or Negative  Under 5 Percent 
Inheritance 
Received 
Number of  Change in  Inheritance  Number of  Change in 
Beneficiaries  Income  Received  Beneficiaries  Income 
242  -2,854,798  16,997,682  148  294,188  10,248,779 
19,487,771 
14,924,315 
7  -  43,158  5,002,242  21  363,306  14,293,016 
157  -  2,079,446  23,213,559  122  573,490 
31  -  371,890  10,784,633  44  434,550 
- 
-  437 
-  -  - 
5,349,292  55,998,116  335 
-  - 
1,665,534  58,953,881 Change in Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of Inheritance (continued) 
~~~~~~~~  ~  ~  ~ 
5 Percent under 10 Percent  10 Percent under  15 Percent 
Number of  Change in  Inheritance  Number of  Change in  Inheritance 
Size of  Inheritance  Beneficiaries  Income  Received  Beneficiaries  Income  Received 
Under $100,000  139  759,489  10,184,132  75  659,587  5,436,714 
$100,000 under $250,000  110  1,314,997  17,805,773  56  1,050,233  8,529,982 
$250,000 under $500,000  34  801,092  11,374,375  10  378,941  3,435,35  1 
$500,000 under $1,OOO,OOO  8  364,623  5,392,852  3  21 1,936  1,879,189 
$1 ,000,000 under $2,500,000  2  152,494  2,465,985  -  -  - 
$2,500,000 or more  -  -  -  -  -  - 
TOTAL  293  3,392,695  47,223,117  144  2,300,703  19,281,236 
Change in Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of Inheritance (continued) 
15 Percent under 20  Percent  20  Percent under 30 Percent 
Number of  Change in  Inheritance  Number of  Change in  Inheritance 
Size of  Inheritance  Beneficiaries  Income  Received  Beneficiaries  Income  Received 
Under $100,000  34 
$100,000 under $250,000  34 
$500,000 under $1,000,000  - 
$l,OO0,000 under $2,500,000  - 
$2,500,000  or more  - 
$250,000 under 500,000  6 
TOTAL  74 
405,801  2,355,276  43 
908,818  5,262,143  18 
3 17,876  1,821,144  3 
3  -  - 
-  -  - 
-  -  - 
1,632,495  9,438,563  66 
755,138  3,085,s  16 
630,784  2,618,485 
1,022,27  1  223,257 
314,545  1,468,956 
-  - 
-  - 
1,923,724  8,205,528 Table 4.3 (continued) 
Change in Gross Capital Income Subject 
to Tax 
as a Percentage of Inheritance 
(continued) 
30 Percent or More 
Number of  Change  Inheritance 
Beneficiaries  in  Received 
Size of  Inheritance  Income 
Under $l00,OOO  70  2,714,991  4,626,742 
$100,000 under $250,000  24  1,730,714  3,392,158 
$250,000 under $500,000  6  2,203,719  2,309,833 
2  509,138  1,654,453  $500,000 under $l,OOO,OOO 
$1,000,000 under $2,500,000 
$2,500,000 or more 
TOTAL 
-  -  - 
102  7,158,562  11,983,186 
~  ~~  ~~~ 
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Table 4.4  Average Net Capital Income Subject to Tax, 1975 and 1978 
Item 
Beneficiaries Other 
All Individual  Than Surviving 
Income Tax Returns  Spouses 




Capital and other gains 
Rents and royalties 
Estates and trusts 
Gross capital income 
subject to tax 
Less: Interest deductions 






































Sources: For all returns, Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax Returns for 1975 
and 1978. For beneficiaries, all identifiable beneficiaries (included in the subject study) 
who received benefits of $50,000 or more and who filed income tax returns for borh 1975 
and 1978. 
income in 1975 faced higher marginal tax rates and therefore had more of 
an incentive to convert or hold their inheritances in the form of preferred 
assets; (2) those with greater amounts of capital income were more likely 
to be savers and accumulators and, in any case, would be less likely to 
need the income from their inheritances for near-term consumption pur- 
poses; (3) many of those owning substantial amounts of capital would al- 
ready be engaged in tax-induced  portfolio  shifting and have access to 
investment advice, whereas inheritors without previous wealth accumula- 
tion more likely would react only with a significant time lag to the tax in- 
centives to hold preferred assets. 
Since the realized rate of return declines with an increase in 1975 capital 
income, it should not surprise us that the percentage of returns showing a 
negative or zero change in capital income would actually rise with an in- 
crease in 1975 capital income. In fact, if one calculates returns reporting 
negative or zero changes in income as a percentage of  total returns with 
similar  amounts  of  1975  capital  income,  a  type  of  U-shaped  curve 
emerges. At the bottom, 40 percent of  those reporting zero or negative 
1975 capital income show even more negative capital income by 1978  after 
receiving inheritances  of  $50,000 or more.  In the middle,  those  with 
$5,000 to $7,500  in 1975 capital income have the smallest percentage of re- 
turns, 17 percent, showing a negative change after receiving their inheri- 
tance. At the top, 49  percent of those with $lOO,OOO  or more of  1975 cap- 
ital income show less (or the same) capital income in 1978. Table 4.5  Change in Gross Capital Income Subject to 
Subject to 'hx (amounts in dollars) 
p8  a Percentage of Inheritance Received by  Size of  Gross Capital Income 
Change in Gross Capital Income Subject to 
Tax as a Percentage of Inheritance 
Income 
Change as a  Zero or Negative 
Change in  Percentage 
Size of Gross Capital Income  Number of  Income  Inheritance  of  Number of  Change in 
Subject to Tax in 1975  Beneficiaries  1975-78  Received  Inheritance  Beneficiaries  Income  Inheritance 
Zero or negative 
$1 under $2,500 
$2,500 under $5,000 
$5,000 under $7,500 
$7,500 under $10,000 
$10,000 under $15,000 
$15,000 under $20,000 
$20,000 under $30,000 
$30,000 under $50,000 
$50,000 under $100,000 






























































-  316,980 
-  271,430 
-  138,315 
-  13,640 
-74,386 
-  279,450 
-  246,667 
-610,026 
-752,210 
-  1,086,604 
-  1,559,584 













Change+  Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of Inheritance 
Under 5 Percent 
Size of Gross Capital Income  Number of  Change in  Number of  Change in 
Subject to Tax in 1975  Beneficiaries  Income  Inheritance  Beneficiaries  Income 
Zero or negative  33  208,051  6,138,233  24  226,315  3,204,985 
$1 under $2,500  150  537,712  19,387,097  113  939,439  13,784,498 
5 Percent under 10 Percent 
Inheritance $2,500 under $5,000 
$5,000 under $7,500 
$7,500 under $lO,OOO 
$10,000 under $15,000 
$15,000 under $20,000 
$20,000 under $30,000 
$30,000 under $50,000 
$50,000 under $l00,OOO 
$100,000 or more 
TOTAL 
48  217,505  7,286,223  41  395,684  5,383,093 
6,122,792  27  1503  1  3  5,308,098  30  432,486 
17  81,559  2,987,902  13  140,136  1,181,693 
19  116,850  4,030,581  21  215,045  2,975,436 
13  119,533  3,880,828  15  247,900  3,342,123 
1,676,855  13  127,667  4,995,503  11  139,487 
9  40,151  2,309,102  13  267,703  3,577,919 
3  24,356  826,337  12  388,500  5,273,723 
3  41,637  1,803,977 
335  1,665,534  58,953,881  293  3,392,695  47,223,117 
Change in Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of Inheritance (continued) 
Size of Gross Capital Income 
Subject to Tax in 1975 
10 Percent under 15 Percent  15 Percent under 20  Percent 
Number of  Change in  Number of  Change in 
Beneficiaries  Income  Inheritance  Beneficiaries  Income  Inheritance 
Zero or negative 
$1 under $2,500 
$2,500 under $5,000 
$5,000 under $7,500 
$7,500 under $10,000 
$10,000 under $15,000 
$15,000 under $20,000 
$20,000 under $30,000 
$30,000 under $50,000 
$50,000 under $l00,OOO 






































































9,438,563 Table 4.5  (continued) 
Change in Gross Capital Income Subject to Tax as a Percentage of  Inheritance (continued) 
20  Percent under 30 Percent 
Size of Gross Capital Income  Number of  Change in  Number of  Change in 
30 Percent or More 
Subject to Tax in 1975  Beneficiaries 
Zero or negative 
$1 under $2,500 
$2,500 under $5,000 
$5,000 under $7,500 
$7,500 under $lO,OOO 
$10,000 under $15,000 
$15,000 under $20,000 
$20,000 under $30,000 
$30,000 under $50,000 
$50,000 under $100,000 
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This finding is consistent  with the observation that there are many 
wealthy taxpayers who report low or negative amounts of capital income 
because of substantial investment in tax-preferred assets or tax shelters of 
various sorts. They probably invest their inheritances in a similar manner. 
Those with significant amounts of reported capital income, on the other 
hand, include the wealthiest of  taxpayers; they are also quite capable of 
limiting their increase in taxable income through sophisticated portfolio 
shifting. Those in the middle, however, often fall into neither category 
and include many whose experience of owning financial assets is confined 
principally to holding deposits in financial institutions. While this last 
group of  individuals may also be likely to invest in owner-occupied hous- 
ing-one  of  the best shelters of  all-housing  purchases are likely to take 
place only in discrete intervals and occur infrequently within a year or two 
after receiving an inheritance. 
In summary,  at least  for persons  receiving  significant inheritances 
($50,000 or more) and for persons who eventually leave sizeable estates 
($60,000 or more), the measure of realized income from capital is likely to 
have only a small relationship to their economic rate of return from assets 
or any other accepted measure of well-being based on property income or 
property. Differences among households  in realized rates of return are 
quite large in all wealth classes. 
4.4  Horizontal Equity: Some Theoretical Considerations 
We have argued that the recognition of income from capital is partly a 
voluntary event and, therefore, that the realized return from capital will 
vary across persons of equal circumstance, whether measured by equal 
economic income, equal wealth, or similar classifier of well-being. Our 
data showed such large variations in realized rates of return across taxpay- 
ers that using realized property income as a basis for measuring equals in 
statistical analyses, as well as tax and welfare programs, must be called 
into serious question. 
One cannot address this topic, however, without turning to some of the 
theoretical arguments against the existence of horizontal inequity. “With 
multiple abilities or different tastes,” as Feldstein notes, “any feasible tax 
on income or consumption will violate horizontal equity” (1976b, p. 129). 
Abstracting from the general case, however, it is then argued that if per- 
sons differ only in their endowment of a single type of ability, but have the 
same tastes, there will be no horizontal inequity. In the extreme case, of 
course, this argument would be hard to refute if  it were assumed that 
equals were so alike in every respect-abilities,  tastes, and outcomes- 
that there was no difference among them, including taxes paid and trans- 
fers received. 110  Eugene Steuerle 
The first qualification to the argument must therefore come when per- 
sons with equal abilities and equal tastes are at least allowed to have dif- 
ferent outcomes because of  luck,  uncertainty, and risk.  Persons with 
equal abilities and tastes, for instance, might still purchase different assets 
with equal expected returns and equal risk. Once we introduce some de- 
gree of randomness to the returns from engaging in various forms of  (in- 
vestment) behavior, ex post results will start to  deviate from ex ante expec- 
tations. 
If tax and welfare systems, as well as statistical analyses, were to be de- 
signed on the basis of ex ante conditions, there would be much less need 
for many of them. In simplest terms, if all persons start out with equal op- 
portunities in life, and several flips of the coin determine eventual well-being, 
a horizontally equitable tax or welfare system designed on an ex ante basis 
would tax everyone equally and grant everyone an equal amount of trans- 
fers. In that sense, except for required governmental goods and services 
such as defense, much of the tax-transfer system would be redundant and 
unnecessary. If, however, taxes, transfers, and statistical analyses are di- 
rected at ex post results, then they cannot ignore the issues of luck, risk, 
and uncertainty, nor can they treat those who have gambled and won the 
same as those who have gambled and lost. 
Part of the argument against horizontal inequity also relies on what will 
be labeled here the market compensation eflect. Even if persons purchase 
assets with different degrees of preference in tax or welfare systems, under 
certain assumptions (sometimes implicit), they will receive the same after- 
tax rewards from those purchases. The market compensates purchasers of 
nonpreferred assets by equilibrating after-tax rates of return across assets, 
while differentials in tax rates are then reflected in different before-tax 
rates of return on assets.’ 
A second qualification must therefore be made if the assumptions of 
the model do not hold in practice. Suppose that taxpayers are taxed under 
a progressive tax system or one in which there are substantial numbers of 
investors (such as tax-exempt institutions or foreign investors). Then it is 
not at all clear that after-tax rates of return will equilibrate across assets 
with different degrees of tax preference. Any movement up in the price of 
an asset A or asset B to equalize after-tax rates of return for a given group 
of taxpayers will give an incentive for arbitrage between A and B by tax- 
exempt investors (or investors in other tax brackets). For instance, foreign 
investors may turn to future markets, short sales, and other financial 
mechanisms to arbitrage between the assets whenever before-tax rates of 
5.  For an excellent model of the extent to which such market compensation might take 
place in a progressive  tax system, as well as the implicit taxes paid and transfers received un- 
der certain conditions, see Galper and Toder 1984. For other portfolio effects, see Bailey 
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return begin to diverge. Theory alone cannot determine whether this fi- 
nancial arbitrage dominates the tax-induced tendency for before-tax rates 
of return to differ according to the preferences given various assets, and 
one must resort in part to studies of institutions and empirical data to try 
to find an answer.6 
What the data show rather conclusively is that preferred assets generally 
have higher economic rates of return than nonpreferred assets (e.g., for 
corporate stock, see Ibbotson and Sinquefield 1982; for farms, see U.S. 
Department of Agriculture 1981).’ In contradiction to the simple market 
compensation argument, interest-bearing assets usually have offered the 
lowest economic rate of return, yet at the same time are accompanied (for 
each investor) by the highest tax rate because of the inclusion of the entire 
inflationary component of the interest rate in income subject to tax. Even 
if the reasons for this result are partly institutional-statutory  limitations 
of  interest rates or the habitual tendency of many lenders and borrowers 
to require a higher before-tax rate of return on business investment than 
on loans financing that investment-the  designer of a tax or welfare pro- 
gram or the statistical observer cannot assume away such differences. 
Our own data also support the notion that those with lower realized 
rates of return have generally achieved higher economic rates of return. 
The very presence of large amounts of wealth means that the top wealth 
holders are likely to have been persons who were successful, rather than 
unsuccessful, in their investment. Yet at the same time, these are the same 
individuals holding the assets with the greatest amount of tax preference 
at the household level. 
A further complication is added, however, once it is recognized that the 
assets with the greatest amount of tax preference are often the most risky, 
at least over a short period of time. One might argue that the compensa- 
tion to holders of nonpreferred assets is hidden by this risk adjustment. 
Indeed, once account is made for risk, it is hard to deny that some com- 
pensation may have taken place through the lowering of economic rates of 
6.  A related issue is the effect of taxes on interest rates, especially in a period of inflation. 
Because inflation raises the effective tax rate on real income from interest-bearing assets, 
and because income from these assets is more vulnerable than other assets to this inflation- 
induced tax, one might initially expect the interest rate to rise by a multiple of the increase in 
the inflation rate.  In almost all attempts to explain the effect of  inflation and taxes on ob- 
served interest rates (e.g., Darby 1975; Tanzi 1980; Peek 1982). however, it is assumed incor- 
rectly that the tax system is proportional or, through use of average marginal tax rates, effec- 
tively proportional  for all investors, both domestic and foreign. This assumption prevents 
the type of financial arbitrage discussed above from working to reduce the increase in the in- 
terest rate. In addition, the failure to take into account the extent to which interest is deducted at 
a higher tax rate than it is included in income, as well as the extent to which receipts are never 
counted at all (Steuerle 1984), leads to a misestimation of average marginal rate. 
7.  An exception, of course, is provided by tax-exempt bonds, but even wealthy individ- 
uals generally hold only a small percentage of their assets in tax-exempt bonds. See Schwartz 
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return on risky, but tax-preferred, assets relative to the rates paid on other 
assets; however, there is no evidence, either theoretical or empirical, that 
this compensation is complete. Partly because of financial arbitrage and 
partly because of institutional factors, for instance, it would be quite diffi- 
cult to provide full compensation to holders of interest-bearing assets if 
interest rates had to rise above the rate of return on other financial assets 
such as stock. 
In deciding whether compensation for taxes paid takes place through 
equalization of after-tax rates of return, the obvious voluntary nature of 
the tax system also must be taken into account. It is simply not possible to 
argue that two persons owning the same stock receive a different economic 
rate of return or face a different risk because one recognizes capital gains 
and the other does not, nor that a person who finds a way to deposit and 
withdraw money from an annuity account faces a different risk or return 
than a person who engages in the same behavior at a bank. The greater the 
voluntariness of the tax, the less there can be any compensation through 
market adjustments to those who pay a higher rate of tax on the same in- 
come. 
In summary, horizontal inequity is unimportant in a world in which 
tastes are so similar among equals that they purchase exactly the same as- 
sets and one is concerned with ex ante rather than ex post distributions of 
welfare. By the same token, all tax and welfare systems can be shown to 
have some degree of horizontal inequity under real-world assumptions of 
several abilities or different tastes.  Between these two worlds lies the 
world of the designer of a tax or  welfare system and the statistical analyst, 
both of whom must classify individuals in categories of equals primarily 
on the basis of means relative to needs, but not tastes. This designer or an- 
alyst must take into account luck, risk and uncertainty, ex post results, the 
inability of the financial markets to fully compensate holders of non-tax- 
preferred assets, and differences in taxes or benefits among individuals 
holding essentially the same assets, but having different patterns of recog- 
nition of income from those assets. 
4.5  Implications for Research and Policy 
There are several research and policy implications to the poor relation- 
ship between the realized rate of return and the economic income, wealth, 
or similar measure of well-being of the household. The first of  the re- 
search implications is in many ways the most obvious, but in other ways 
the most difficult to handle. A statistical analysis of household character- 
istics, government payments, or taxes can be very misleading when it uses 
realized income as a variable or classifier. The researcher may be aware of 
the misleading nature of the data, but in few cases will his readers have a 
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tion often can be made only by imputation of other information. Because 
imputation is statistically imprecise, it often reduces bias only by adding 
errors of measurement to a file. 
Studies such as the estate-income match help us to make the imputa- 
tions that are necessary. Because we can obtain fairly good information on 
the relationship between realized income and wealth, we can enhance our 
ability to take files with only reported income from property and make 
imputations of wealth onto those files through the investment income ap- 
proach to  wealth estimation (Atkinson and Harrison 1978, p.  171). Impu- 
tations of economic income will be more difficult, but, once wealth is esti- 
mated,  independent  studies  of  returns  to  ownership of  stock,  land, 
housing, and other assets can also be used. 
Information on the ratio of realized income to asset value can also help 
to correct measures of the degree of inequality in society or the count of 
those in poverty (e.g., U.S.  Bureau of the Census 1981). From the type of 
data reported here, one can get an idea of the number of persons with sub- 
stantial wealth who report low amounts of realized income from capital. 
This data must be supplemented at the bottom end of the distribution. 
Here survey data have a better chance of filling the void, both because 
wage income will tend to dominate property income no matter what the 
error and because there are usually fewer types of assets held and, except 
for homes and pensions, lesser amounts of unrealized income for which to 
account. 
Proper measurement of  property and property income is crucial for 
policy purposes as well. Welfare programs using realized income as a mea- 
sure of means would probably be better off  abandoning altogether the 
measure of realized income (except as a compliance check of actual prop- 
erty ownership) and turning instead to a measure of ability based upon 
wage income and property. For instance, an estimate of expected economic 
income from net worth, a fraction of net worth, or the annuity value of 
net worth could be added to wage income. Any of these measures would 
appear to be a more accurate, and less horizontally inequitable, measure 
of means than wage income plus realized income from property. Such a 
shift would redistribute  welfare benefits more toward the longer-term 
poor and those with lesser amounts of wealth (Steuerle and McClung 
1977). This approach also would have the advantage of no longer separat- 
ing homes from other assets, and it could eliminate the need for separate 
asset tests with arbitrary cutoff or notch points.  In addition, it would 
solve the problem of treating interest income as real income no matter 
what the rate of inflation, thus requiring welfare recipients to spend down 
their wealth at different rates in different years. These corrections need 
not add nor subtract to total welfare payments, but can be done in a way 
to make more equal the distribution of such payments across households 
of equal means relative to needs. 114  Eugene Steuerle 
As for the tax system, better measurement of property or property in- 
come is certainly necessary if the base of the tax is meant to be economic 
income. Better measurement would require some substantial changes in 
the tax laws, including accurate measurement of economic depreciation, 
indexing or approximate indexing of different types of returns from cap- 
ital, and movement toward an accrual rather than a realization base. By 
the same token, corporate, individual, and property taxes would need to 
be better integrated. One tax could be meant as a substitute for another 
tax, but an integrated design would need to eliminate conditions whereby 
some persons paid double taxes, while others with equal incomes paid no 
tax at all. Some of these steps would tend to raise taxes and some would 
lower them, but that should not be allowed to  detract from the fact that it 
is possible to move toward greater horizontal equity in the income tax 
without necessarily raising or lowering the taxes on income from capital. 
If our capability of taxing uniformly income from wealth continues to 
prove so poor, it raises the distinct possibility that a solution to the prob- 
lem may come from the measurement of property value rather than of re- 
alized income. Such a solution is readily feasible when considering corpo- 
rate wealth in publicly traded stock. Even the normal property tax on real 
estate, despite the variation in effective rates because of poor administra- 
tion, may prove to provide less horizontal inequity with respect to property 
owners than does the income tax.8 Its potential to provide more horizon- 
tal equity than a realized property income base is even greater. Better inte- 
gration of property taxes with realized income taxes again may provide a 
back-door  way of moving toward more uniform treatment  of income 
from all assets. 
If horizontal equity is the goal, better measurement of property and 
property income in required regardless of whether society moves further 
in the direction of a consumption tax or maintains an income tax. Hori- 
zontal equity requires at a minimum that, if two persons have equal in- 
comes and equal savings, they should pay the same amount of  taxes re- 
gardless of whether the ideal tax base is income or consumption. 
The current policy approach of using realized income, adjusted by var- 
ious piecemeal savings and investment incentives, unequivocally fails the 
standard of horizontal equity. Although the focus of this chapter has been 
on equity issues, the efficiency costs of existing failures to provide uni- 
form treatment of different sources of capital income may be quite sub- 
stantial and are caused by  the same measurement problems that create 
horizontal inequity (Steuerle 1983b; Galper and Steuerle 1983). 
Obviously, if no societal consensus exists on whether to move toward an 
income or a consumption standard, the steps that can be agreed upon will 
be less. All of the following, however, at least move in the direction of 
8. See Aaron 1975 for an argument that the property tax may also be progressive. 115  Wealth, Realized Income, and the Measure of Well-Being 
meeting the common standard of  imposing the same tax on those who 
have both equal incomes and equal savings: uniform measurement and 
taxation of real economic income from property, regardless of  so~rce;~ 
unification of  savings and investment incentives to measure total savings 
and investment; and uniform reciprocal treatment of interest paid and re- 
ceived, or borrowing (dissavings) and savings. 
In summary, both for research and policy purposes, reliance upon real- 
ized income from capital as part of a measure of well-being has led to mis- 
leading analyses and poorly designed programs. The standard of horizon- 
tal equity in tax and welfare programs is violated whether the measure of 
equals is on the basis of economic income or consumption. Accounting 
for economic income may be difficult, but there are approximate methods 
that would allow greater accuracy in statistical analyses and a fairer distri- 
bution of benefits and taxes in government programs. 
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Comment  James D. Smith 
All societies have both political and functional imparities to define well- 
being. It is inevitably a topic of political debate, but beyond the realm of 
campaign rhetoric. The political process is the mechanism by which mea- 
sures of well-being are translated into policies for sharing the burden of 
public goods, one of which is the distribution of well-being itself. The 
term well-being has a ring to it that endears it to  those charged with enno- 
bling entrances to public edifices, drafting political tracts, or engaging in 
pure theory-all  endeavors where the felicity of language transcends un- 
derstanding.  For public policy a more analytically tractable concept is 
necessary. The most widely applied proxy for well-being is realized in- 
come. Steuerle suggests that the use of realized income derives from his- 
toric accident, convenience, and ideology. Whatever the reasons for the 
use, it is not Steuerle’s chosen burden to explicate them, but rather to dis- 
abuse the reader of any notion that it is a wise use. He does this in a minor 
way by the didactics of public finance texts, but in a more compelling way 
by putting on display a new data base, indeed, a data base that is not yet 
quite finished. In its present state it is like the product of the consummate 
designer of women’s fashion: in good taste, but revealing just enough to 
maximize speculation and interest on the part of the viewer. Steuerle spec- 
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ulates a great deal about what is behind his data, and I will turn to his 
speculations and some of my own in a moment, but first let me describe its 
nature. 
For routine statistical processing in its Statistics of Income (SOI) pro- 
gram, the Internal Revenue Service drew a sample of about 41 ,000 federal 
estate tax returns filed in 1977. These returns were for decedents who died 
in 1977 or before (the majority of them being for decedents in 1976 and 
1977). A one-in-ten subsample, or about 4,100 estate tax returns, was se- 
lected for Steuerle from the initial IRS sample with the intent that for each 
of these, the income tax return of the decedent in the year preceding his 
death would be located as well as the income tax return of the decedent’s 
nonspousal legatees in the year prior to and the year following inheri- 
tance. For reasons that are not obvious, but troubling, tax returns from 
the year preceding death were not found for over one-quarter of the dece- 
dents for whom an estate tax return had been selected. The about 2,900 
decedents for whom an income tax return could be found were used for 
part of the analysis presented in Steuerle’s paper. 
Estate tax returns require filers to list legatees along with their Social 
Security number and amount bequeathed them. Steuerle formed a second 
analysis file consisting of all nonspousal legatees who received $50,000 or 
more and for whom an income tax return could be found for 1975 and 
1978. Thus, he has a set of legatees for whom he knows taxable income 
shortly before and shortly after the receipt of a bequest of $50,000 or 
more. The size of this sample is 1,451 legatees. 
Thus, he has two sets of data, one relating decedent’s wealth to income 
in the year preceding death and another relating the income in the years 
preceding and following an inheritance to that inheritance. 
I applaud the kind of administrative record matching Steuerle is doing; 
we need a lot more of  it. In its present state the data are not representative 
of any meaningful population, however, and our uses of them should 
keep this in mind. Steuerle notes that the SO1 file was stratified according 
to size of gross estate. He argues that because his analysis deals primarily 
with issues of  within- and between-wealth classes that the unweighted 
form of his file will not be biased. 
Although I agree with this proposition so far as he wishes to  make state- 
ments about rich decedents and draw some inferences about income/ 
wealth relationships, it does not follow, that one can safely make infer- 
ences about the importance of income/wealth relationships for the living 
population, which is the relevant one. The estate tax returns are a sample 
of wealthy, living persons stratified by age, sex, race, and marital status. 
The stratification occurs because the sample is drawn by death, and fac- 
tors that influence mortality rates make it unrepresentative of the living 
population. For instance, his sample overrepresents older persons who 
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The sample can be unbiased by weighting the observations by the recip- 
rocals of  mortality rates applicable to decedent characteristics. In table 
C4.1, I compare the asset composition in Steuerle’s sample of  decedents 
to the asset composition of the SO1 file after it was weighted to represent 
the living population  sufficiently wealthy to file estate tax returns were 
they to die. The weighting reverses the relative importance of  real estate 
and corporate stock-the  two largest asset types, and ones that have quite 
different income realization potentials because real estate is dominated by 
owner-occupied residential structures. 
To the extent that behavior related to age, sex, and other mortality- 
related variables bear upon realization rates or portfolio composition, 
properly  weighted  data would  give  different  results.  Steuerle’s  main 
point, that the variance of realization rates is so high as to render realized 
income an inappropriate measure of  well-being, is so obvious in the data 
that it will likely hold when the sample is weighted, but the observed dis- 
persion of the realization rates will be compressed some. His findings also 
pose considerable challenge to researchers who would link income and 
wealth either by capitalizing income flows or by converting asset value to 
yield. I will return to  these research issues later. First, let me comment fur- 
ther on Steuerle’s findings. 
In table 4.1 Steuerle provides an overall view of the composition of the 
income of these relatively affluent individuals and of  the proportion that 
each income type represents of  total net worth. On first glance the per- 
centages that incomes represent of total net worth seem too small. But 
when one remembers that these income flows are essentially for 1975, 
when the average yield of stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
was 4.1 percent and treasury bills were yielding about 6 percent, the aggre- 
gate taxable income of this group which represented about 4.4 percent of 
its net worth certainly does not seem implausible. Keep in mind that not 
lsible C4.1  Comparison of Asset Composition from Weighted SO1 File and 
Unweighted Collation File 
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only is this group rich, but it is made up of considerably more women and 
older persons than would be found in a random selection of equally rich 
individuals. This accounts for the relatively small share, 25.5 percent, of 
total income represented by wages and salaries. The interpretation of the 
percentage that a particular income flow, such as dividends, represents of 
total net worth is not obvious. But Steuerle is pushed to such comparisons 
because in the period between the income tax return and death one can 
convert assets-stock  into cash for instance. For treasury bills the oppor- 
tunity for conversion to cash would be automatic with the maturity of the 
bill. 
Steuerle goes on, making the point quite strongly in table 4.2 that con- 
siderable variability exists in realized income from capital. He compares 
the gross capital income reported on income tax returns in the year before 
decedents’ deaths with the value of  assets reported on their estate tax re- 
turns. He notes that the average rate of realization declines with size of 
wealth. Decedents with under $lOO,OOO  in gross assets had a realization 
rate of 12.4 percent, while those with $2.5 million or more of wealth had a 
realization rate of 2.2  percent. He points out that an examination was un- 
dertaken of cases with unusually high rates of realization; it was found 
that dividend and interest income were implausibly high relative to total 
assets. He speculates that the time interval between the reporting of in- 
come and the recording of assets may have permitted people to  transfer or 
consume wealth. Thus the high rates of realization observed for some de- 
cedents may, in fact, be a problem of intertemporal misalignment of ac- 
counting points and periods. I agree with the general speculation, but let 
me pursue it a bit. 
First, it is known from estate tax data that costs of last illness can be 
substantial. The population with which he is dealing is quite old: the mean 
age is seventy-two. One can easily imagine prolonged illnesses. If the cost 
of these illnesses is less variable across individuals than is the value of their 
assets, the relatively higher medical cost for the less aWuent of these rich 
folks diminishes their assets relatively more than it does the assets of the 
more affluent, and the ratio of their taxable income in the year before 
death to their wealth reported in their estate tax return is consequently 
higher. Steuerle can pursue this issue by examining the cost-of-last-illness 
value reported on the estate tax returns. He can also, with greater effort, 
locate decedents’ death certificates, which provide information on cause 
of death and duration of last illness. Both of these might serve as proxies 
for the consumption of medical services. 
In addition to consuming medical services, it is reasonable to expect 
that some of this decedent population was drawing down its assets for 
general consumption expenditures prior to death. If this drawing down in- 
volved the liquidation of bills, notes, and bonds as they matured, interest 
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face value of the instruments will have been used for consumption and 
will not show up in the estate tax returns. If one hypothesizes, as I do, that 
consumption expenditures will not be proportional to  wealth for this pop- 
ulation, then the liquidation of assets will be relatively more important for 
the less affluent than for the more affluent. Thus the proportion of wealth 
represented by capital income would appear to be larger than for the more 
affluent in the Steuerle file. 
There is also the problem that bearer bonds may generate an interest 
flow but can be “informally” distributed among the heirs, hence escaping 
taxation and not appearing in the estate tax return. Finally, there is the 
problem of the tax-paying unit represented on the estate tax return versus 
the tax-paying unit represented on the income tax return.  It is not clear 
from Steuerle’s discussion how income reported on a joint income tax re- 
turn is related to the assets on an estate tax return, which is always filed 
for a sole decedent. There is not an easy solution to  the problem of ascrib- 
ing ownership of income on joint returns to the person owning assets on 
the estate tax return. Although the income tax return in 1976 requested 
that dividend income be designated as joint or as belonging to the hus- 
band or wife, taxpayer compliance with this request is believed to have 
been very poor. Furthermore, large amounts of dividend income were fre- 
quently reported as from street accounts without differentiation among 
different street accounts or the ownership thereof.  For other types of 
property income no designation of ownership was required on the return. 
Some insight into the joint return problem could be provided by analyzing 
separately joint  returns and  all other  returns.  It  is  suspected that if 
Steuerle were able to make corrections for the temporal misalignment of 
the income-reporting period and the asset evaluation point as well as for 
assets that are informally distributed, the variation of  rates of  return 
across wealth-size classes would be considerably compressed. There still 
would remain substantial within-class variation of rates of realization, 
however. Steuerle notes with respect to table 4.2 that at least 5 percent of 
each wealth class has zero or negative realization rates. Because the de- 
nominator for the realization rate is gross assets, negative rates must come 
about because of negative income. This suggests that significant numbers 
of farm and business losses are present on the income tax returns. Since 
farms and business assets are more likely to be held by men than women, 
when the file is weighted the proportion of negative and zero rates of re- 
turn can be expected to increase. 
Thirty percent of  the decedent population had realization rates of  10 
percent or more as calculated by Steuerle. However, 20 percent of the de- 
cedent population with assets of $lOO,OOO  or less reported realization rates 
of 15 percent or more. I suggest that the factors offered in explanation for 
the overall high average realization rate (12.4 percent) for the group are at 
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There is another factor that can generate artificially high realization 
rates. Professional practices and some small business assets are frequently 
identified with the owner. The value of the business for estate tax purposes 
may come down to an evaluation of accounts receivable and physical 
property, but the business income reported on tax returns reflects the own- 
er’s marketability. In purely economic terms, there would be a large factor 
payment to labor, but on the tax return it would all appear as business in- 
come. Thus we have a confounded problem of misconceptualization of 
income and asset devaluation induced by death. 
Next Steuerle looks at the change in capital income from 1975 to 1978 
for legatees other than spouses who inherited $50,000  or more. In the upper- 
right-hand portion of table 4.3 Steuerle calculates the change in gross cap- 
ital income between 1975 and 1978 as a percentage of the amount of in- 
heritance received. For the 1,451 inheritors, the change in gross capital in- 
come amounted to approximately 6 percent. Because these inheritors were 
nonspouses, it is reasonable to speculate that assets such as residential 
housing, consumer durables, works of art, and other non-yield-producing 
forms were less important in these inheritances than they would have been 
in the inheritances of spouses. Given this and the fact that one might rea- 
sonably expect some increment in legatees’ asset holdings to have oc- 
curred quite independent of any inheritance, a change in gross capital in- 
come that  amounted to 6 percent  of  the  inheritance  does  not  seem 
unreasonable at all. Steuerle notes there is relatively little difference in the 
realization rate by size of inheritance. This is also plausible for the same 
reasons. When one looks at the percentage that change in gross capital in- 
come represents of the value of inheritance within inheritance-size  classes, 
however, one finds a substantial variability. For instance, nearly one-third 
of those inheriting between $50,000 and $lOO,OOO have negative changes 
in gross capital income between 1975 and 1978.  It is difficult, however, to 
tease much understanding out of the table because so many unobservable 
things are going on. For instance, we know little about the age of the in- 
heritors and to what extent they might be selling off  assets. We  do not 
know the value of the assets they held prior to inheritance. For inheritors 
with substantial preinheritance wealth, small fluctuations in the rate of re- 
turn of their prior wealth could swamp percentage changes in income due 
to inherited wealth. For inheritors who are farm and business proprietors, 
normal year-to-year variability in income could be substantially greater 
than any variability induced by the newly inherited assets. If the inheri- 
tance was itself a farm or business asset, then the variability in the asset 
yield on the inheritance  itself could be quite large. In this particular instance 
the data has revealed too little to us to excite much speculation. 
Finally, in table 4.5 Steuerle looks at changes in gross capital income 
over the period 1975 to 1978 by size of 1975 gross capital income. This is 
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Steuerle’s argument on realization rates qualifies this use of it. When he 
does this he finds that individuals with zero or negative capital income in 
1975 were much more likely to have zero or negative changes in their cap- 
ital income from 1975 to 1978 as were individuals with relatively high 1975 
capital income. He speculates that persons with zero or negative capital 
income in 1975 and those with high capital income in 1975 are, in fact, 
similar individuals, the implication being that those with zero or negative 
capital income really were holding substantial amounts of assets but were 
effectively using tax shelters, as were very wealthy persons in 1975. It was, 
he argues, the petty rich, those with capital incomes between $2,500 and 
$20,000, who had high realization rates and consequently were taxed on 
their lack of tax sophistication. He speculates that legatees with large 1975 
capital incomes were sensitive to high marginal tax rates and had strong 
incentives to convert their inheritances into preferred asset forms since 
they were likely to be savers and had already accumulated large amounts 
of wealth. Their propensity to consume out of their inheritances would be 
low. He also speculates that the owners of substantial capital would have a 
higher probability of  having already engaged in tax-induced portfolio 
shifting and have access to investment advice. Legatees without previous 
wealth accumulations would have a tendency to  engage in tax minimiza- 
tion efforts only after a time lapse. Again, Steuerle’s speculations are 
plausible and the evidence is suggestive, but the reader is left with a terri- 
ble sense of urgency to examine the files in detail to understand what is 
really going on behind the tabulated results. 
Conclusions and Research Implications 
Steuerle, without a doubt, demonstrates that realized income is an inap- 
propriate measure of well-being. To the extent that it is used as a basis for 
allocating tax burdens and transfers, it introduces substantial horizontal 
and vertical inequities. Although the collation file will provide substantial 
insight into the equity issues posed by the use of realized income, even 
after it is weighted and much more is understood about the file, we will 
have done only the necessary preliminary work to exploit the rich body of 
data he has assembled. 
Although I encourage Steuerle to continue examining the relationship 
between income tax returns and assets on estate tax returns, I suggest that 
once he has completed this task that he consider a slightly different strategy. 
Given the information he has available from the collation file plus some 
additional information he could obtain or may already have, I would ar- 
gue for reconstructing a balance sheet for each individual decedent as it 
existed at some point within the year of the income tax return in the colla- 
tion file. This would not necessarily be an easy task. It will require using 
information income tax returns filed by the decedent prior to his death 
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alive but did not file. It might also require searching for gift tax returns. 
The central issue is that of entering into the balance sheet the value of as- 
sets that disappeared because they were consumed or transferred between 
the income tax observation and the estate tax observation in the collation 
file. Schedule C will be of some value in this endeavor as will information 
on medical costs that appear in the estate tax return as well as in the in- 
come tax return. Once one has such a file, not only can one make judg- 
ments about equity distortion introduced by the utilization of realized in- 
come  but  one  can  move  a  considerable distance the  derivation  of 
economic income for relatively affluent individuals. Such a file could be 
the basis for simulating a variety of tax policies. 
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